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17 August 1961

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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
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




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
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
South Korean leader Lt. Gen. Pak Chong-hui's promise to return the government to civilian authority in 1963 will probably ease public uncertainty caused by the APPROVED FOR RELEASE military coup. Many South Koreans are in sympathy with JUL 2001 the reformist objectives of the regime, if not with the regime itself, and probably will agree that 18 months are necessary to weed out corruption, institute basic reforms, and launch the five-year economic development

program.



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


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


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SOUTH KOREA

South Korean press reaction to Lt. Gen. Pak Chong-hui's program for a return to civilian government in 1963 has generally been favorable but cautious. President Yun Po-sun adopted a similar attitude and publicly endorsed Pak's 12 August announcement. He reflected the desire of educated civilian elements for an early return to civilian government by expressing hope that circumstances would permit a shortened period of military control.

The President also has indicated concern over limitations placed on free political activity prior to the transfer of power and fears that the junta, under pressure from extremist young colonels, will continue to try to direct affairs after the re-establishment of civilian government.

In his statement to the nation, Pak promised that, in accord with the regime's early pledge, the government would be returned to civilian control in the shortest time possible consistent with "eliminating vice and establishing the foundations for new democratic institutions." He outlined a timetable providing for the resumption of political activities by early 1963, the adoption of a new constitu-

tion before March of the same year, general elections in May, and a transfer of power the following summer. The new constitution is to provide for a strong president, with a 100- to 120-seat unicameral legislature. The regime intends to prohibit corrupt and dishonest former politicians from again becoming politically active.

On 15 August the junta released Lt. Gen. Yi Han-lim and seven other senior officers arrested shortly after the 16 May coup for "hesitating" to support the revolution. Yi was commander of the South Korean First Army, the faired very restricted the faired the f stationed along the lend itarize Zone facing the Communist North. The release of the eight was undoubtedly designed to reduce sensitivity over arbitrary and repressive actions of the junta and to encourage public confidence in the regime's promise to return government to civilian control.

Many South Koreans are in sympathy with the reformist objectives of the junta, if not with the junta itself, and probably will agree that 18 months are necessary to weed out corruption, institute basic reforms, and launch the regime's fiveyear economic development program. However, educated

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civilian elements have reason to question the regime's intentions. Security chief Col. Kim Chong-pil has stated that the junta intends to remain politically active beyond the time when civilian government is reestablished. Some reports have suggested that Pak Chong-hui himself is prepared to assume the presidency and is prepared to rig the elections if necessary to enable the military to retain the real power.

